@article{Pouivet_2019, title={The Right to Believe that only one Religion is true}, volume={3}, url={https://frai.iphras.ru/article/view/3670}, DOI={10.21146/2587-683X-2019-3-2-87-96}, abstractNote={<div>Some philosophers claim to show that religious diversity should lead rational beings to find some conciliation between them. They say that diversity should mean that no one could pretend to hold the truth. We must therefore renounce alethic exclusivity, the claim that a certain religion possesses by itself the truth. This encourages religious scepticism, because when well-informed and reasonable people disagree about their religious or anti-religious beliefs, their confidence in the justification of their beliefs must be reduced or diminished even if that belief were true – to the point that these people are intellectually reconciled. Let us call this claim the Principle of Intellectual Conciliation. I will first claim that it is not a sound principle of intellectual ethics. For that, I will first show that if this Principle claims to sceptically conclude to the plurality of religions, it is, in reality, a reasoning from a sceptical dogma, and not only a reasoning that leads to scepticism. I mean that it is a hidden atheistic argument disguised as an honest neutral reasoning. As it calls for an ethical requirement of rationality, without being then so transparent that it seems, it is important to show that this Principle borders on deception. I am secondly going to show that, even if one accepts to allow oneself to be conciliated by reasoning, the Principle has serious flaws, especially with regard to the philosophical psychology of religious faith. My conclusion will be that it is wrong that we should suspend any religious belief that an alleged epistemic peer does not share as soon as we become aware that he does not share it. It is not true that it is rational in any case to respect the Principle of Intellectual Conciliation, and that another attitude would always be irrational and morally disgusting.</div>}, number={2}, journal={Философия религии: аналитические исследования}, author={Pouivet, Roger}, year={2019}, month={дек.}, pages={87-96} }