Naturalistic Argument for Theism: a Response to Critics

Abstract

In this paper, I give a response to the objections against the naturalistic argument for theism proposed in my paper “Diversity of religious experience and justification of theism: the challenge of Voodoo epistemology”. In response to Vladimir Shokhin’s claim, I argue that even if the choice of religion is a matter of personal taste, it does not make theistic believers immune to the problem of religious diversity. Next, in response to Vladimir Shokhin’s and Matvey Sysoev’s objections, I demonstrate that naturalism is compatible with a theistic worldview. The claim that our actions and beliefs are predetermined is in line with the doctrine of predetermination found in various versions of classical theism, and the belief that God is a non-physical cause of the world does not contradict the principle of causal closure. I criticize Igor Gasparov’s claim that Voodoo beliefs can be defeated without naturalism and his suggestions about the physical nature of spirits. I demonstrate that naturalistic arguments for theism make sense in the context of both externalism and internalism. Reacting to Gasparov’s arguments, I discuss how it is possible to form justified beliefs about causally inert entities such as mathematical objects and spirits if we accept both theism and naturalism. Finally, I examine whether the hypothetical belief in the team of creating spirits put forward by Sysoev could meet a naturalistic condition to become a viable alternative to theism.