Epistemology of disagreement and tolerance with respect of religious diversity (pluralism)

Abstract

In this paper I provide theoretical and comparative treatments of the problem of religious diversity. The theoretical aspect of the paper includes epistemological and ethical considerations. As regards to epistemology I, following A. Plantinga, formulate de jure and de facto arguments against religious belief; as for ethics I am dealing with the notion of tolerance considering it not only as a right a freedom of religion, but also as a virtue. Accepting the widespread position in recent discussions on the topic that there is no true epistemic peers in the context of religious diversity, and following the lines of epistemic and ethic arguments presented in the first part of the paper, I establish a new cumulative requirement which might form the following discussions on the problem. According to this requirement one should take into account de jure argument nuanced by peer-disagreement corrections and ethic argument from toleration. Then I consider how the main possible solutions for the problem of religious diversity (i.e. exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism, relativism) fit this new cumulative requirement. I conclude that relativism most easily agrees with the cumulative requirement, however, due to its destructive consequences and self-contradiction, it is most difficult to accept this position. I state that the most natural and reasonable posi - tions is pluralism.