God's Moral Goodness

Abstract

Philosophers have tried to demonstrate the nature of God – either by arguing that it is a priori necessary that there is a perfect being, and that perfection entails having a certain nature (Anselm); or by arguing that the existence and nature of the universe is such as to entail or make it probable that its creator God has a certain nature (Aquinas). In my probabilistic argument I pursue the second way, arguing that the existence and nature of the universe makes it probable that the universe was created and sustained by an essentially everlasting omnipotent person. An omnipotent person will be a “best-acting” God. He will therefore only allow bad states to exist if allowing them is logically necessary for the existence of some good state. I argue against Mark Murphy’s claim, that God is so different from ordinary humans that there is no reason to suppose that there is much in common between his obligations and those of humans. A morally perfect being would be not merely a best-acting God, but also a “best-feeling” God. He would allow himself to have the right feelings, which are feelings good in themselves, or right reactions to human actions and situations; or feelings which are logically necessary for a great good, such as the pain felt by Jesus on the cross. This account of God’s feelings is consistent with conciliar definitions that God is “impassible” in his divine nature.